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1. Summary  
This report summarises evidence of the effectiveness of each of the following influences for 
incentivising businesses to adopt more responsible practices: 
 Customer pressure: strong incentive. Consumers increasingly care about 
environmental and social impacts, and the expectations of consumers both in high- and 
low-income countries are a significant influence on the behaviour of companies.  
 Transparency and reporting schemes: weak incentive. Voluntary transparency and 
reporting schemes are increasingly widespread, but provide only a weak incentive to 
businesses if they do not contain mechanisms for engagement or enforcement. 
 Shareholder activism: strong incentive. Shareholders and investment management 
firms exert strong influence over publicly traded companies by engaging with 
management or voting on shareholder resolutions. 
 Workers’ and managers’ values: weak incentive. The degree to which workers’ and 
managers’ personal values influence companies’ business practices is unclear, but there 
is no strong evidence of clear influence. 
 Business performance benefits: strong incentive. There is increasingly robust 
evidence that improving environmental and social standards can improve companies’ 
long-term financial performance. 
Limitations and scope 
This report attempts to estimate the strength of the evidence available for each of these influence 
pathways, but in the time available for this short report it has not been possible to undertake a 
comprehensive review of the literature on each type of incentive.  A comprehensive literature 
review, evidence map, or similar product could provide a higher degree of confidence in the 
strength of the evidence in each area. 
The scope of this report has been agreed to focus on a range of external drivers that may 
incentivise businesses to voluntarily adopt more responsible business practices.  The scope 
excludes laws, regulations, and mandatory requirements such as those embedded in legal 
arrangements like trade agreements. 
Terminology 
When discussing responsible and inclusive business practices, and particularly when quoting 
from or paraphrasing from the literature, this report also uses the following terms which are 
commonly found in the literature:  
 Corporate social responsibility (CSR) refers to voluntarily incorporating environmental 
and social concerns into a company’s business practices. 
 Environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) is a term used in the 
business and investing literature, which also refers to these issues as ‘non-financial 
reporting’ in contrast to traditional corporate reports which have until recently discussed 
business operations in primarily financial terms. 
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2. Customer pressure 
There is good evidence that the expectations of individual retail consumers and business 
customers, in wealthy countries and in developing countries, play a significant role in influencing 
the behaviour of companies.   
Customers’ purchasing choices have long been influenced by environmental and social 
concerns.  ‘Consumers care not only about the price and quality of products and services, but 
increasingly about environmental and social ‘footprints’ as well’ (United Nations Global Compact 
& Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2010, p. 20). Some twenty years ago, IKEA adopted a code of conduct 
for its suppliers in response to customers in its stores asking ‘how a given product has been 
produced, who has produced it and where’ (Andersen & Skjoett-Larsen, 2009, p. 79).  More 
recently, a consumer survey for the UN Global Compact in 2014 found that 21% of North 
Americans, 27% of Europeans, and 39% of Africans and Latin Americans report that they often 
or always consider sustainability when selecting products and services (Accenture, 2014, p. 9).  
A meta-review of academic, NGO, and business literature in 2017 found that sales and 
marketing benefits were consistently cited as reasons for adopting sustainability standards, 
mentioned by 98% of the sources reviewed (Molenaar & Kessler, 2017, p. 5).   
Reputational concerns are an important incentive for adopting codes of conduct, creating 
monitoring systems alone or with partners, or otherwise improving corporate governance in 
relation to environmental and labour protections. ‘Numerous studies reveal how pressure by 
consumers (both individual and institutional), media, activists, regulators, shareholders, and 
others threatens the reputation of the brand or company’ (Berliner, Greenleaf, Lake, Levi, & 
Noveck, 2015, p. 200).  A study involving interviewing or surveying 71 leading global companies 
found that 97% of the respondents cited reputational risk resulting from public exposure of 
worker abuse in the supply chain or company operations as the biggest driver for action on 
modern slavery (Lake, MacAlister, Berman, Gitsham, & Page, 2016, p. 8).  Retail brands selling 
to individuals are ‘especially vulnerable to negative publicity about social or environmental 
conditions in their supply chain’ (Andersen & Skjoett-Larsen, 2009, p. 76), but retail customers’ 
expectations also translate into requirements for companies further down global supply chains.  
Companies that operate in a business-to-business mode also report ‘growing pressure from their 
business customers to provide assurance on what they are doing to address modern slavery’ 
(Lake et al., 2016, p. 9).   
Consumer pressure can be mobilised in response to specific incidents which threaten to harm a 
company’s reputation, and can be coordinated and amplified by civil society groups, the media, 
or in collaboration with other kinds of organisations.  For example, in 2014 a Thai company 
(Charoen Pokphand Foods) supplying prawns to European and American supermarket chains 
was accused of using fishmeal obtained from fishing boats operated by slaves to feed their 
prawns, and public pressure forced the supermarkets to withdraw its products (Gold, Trautrims, 
& Trodd, 2015, p. 4).  In 2009, an international network called the Worker Rights Consortium 
undertook a year-long campaign to improve labour standards in garment factories in Honduras.  
The campaign linked garment workers with students and administrators in North American 
universities, which were major customers of branded garments, and led to significant 
improvements in labour standards across Honduras (Arengo, 2019).   
As consumers, particularly in wealthy countries, become more conscious about sustainability 
issues, ﬁrms use certiﬁcation and labelling schemes as signalling devices and to develop a 
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green reputation (Schleifer, 2017, pp. 690–691).  There has been a large increase over the past 
decade in the number of certification, labelling, and standards schemes, reflecting ‘a demand 
among consumers, buyers and producers to address common environmental and social 
concerns’ (Lernoud et al., 2018, p. xviii).  The Ecolabel Index, for example, identifies 463 different 
labelling schemes in 199 countries and 25 industry sectors (Big Room, 2019).  Unfortunately, 
however, the proliferation of labelling schemes ‘creates confusion for consumers and the industry 
and is standing in the way of genuinely sustainable consumption’ (Changing Markets Foundation, 
2018, p. 7).   
As certification schemes are voluntary, and as there is a wide range of schemes available, 
companies and industries can adopt schemes of varying rigour depending on their objectives.  
Customers unfamiliar with the details of certification schemes may not be able to make fully 
informed choices.  In Brazil, for example, in the early 2010s, the sugarcane industry aimed to sell 
to European markets, and adopted a rigorous environmental certification scheme to satisfy EU 
requirements, while the soy industry, responding to high demand from China which had little 
interest in sustainability issues, elected not to pursue certification (Schleifer, 2017).  A study of 
575 coffee farms in Latin America examining the recent proliferation of new ‘in-house’ 
certification schemes (schemes operated by firms such as Starbucks, Nespresso, and others for 
their own supply chains, rather than independent certifications like Fairtrade and Organic) found 
that farms operating under in-house certifications showed better environmental performance than 
non-certified farms, but ‘do not display substantially better social conduct than non-certified 
farmers’ (Giuliani, Ciravegna, Vezzulli, & Kilian, 2017, p. 307).  
3. Transparency and reporting initiatives 
Many voluntary initiatives are attempting to increase transparency about companies’ 
performance on environmental and social issues.  These initiatives are normally predicated on 
the assumption that companies will compete to obtain better rankings and reduce reputational 
risks, and intend to ‘harness the power of the consumer to demand and use the information to 
help prevent slavery and exploitation’ (Nolan & Bott, 2018, p. 53).  Although participation in these 
schemes has been popular, the literature suggests that at best it is ‘uncertain what impact this 
has had on actual corporate behaviour’ (Baghuis, 2018, p. 8) and that at worst such initiatives 
‘are generally insufficient to regulate corporate conduct’ (Nolan & Bott, 2018, p. 52).   
Initiatives that merely require disclosure without active engagement or regulatory consequences 
appear not to be a sufficient incentive to induce companies to change practices significantly 
(Nolan & Bott, 2018, pp. 57–59).  A George Washington University study (Aaronson & Wham, 
2016, p. 18) evaluating four supply chain disclosure initiatives (the Dodd Frank Conflict Minerals 
and Publish What You Pay Provisions, EU Conflict Minerals Supply Chain Transparency 
Regulation, California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, and UK Modern Slavery Act) found 
that these initiatives: 
 were expensive to implement; 
 had not led the bulk of firms to report, and the ones that do report only make broad 
statements and general commitments; 
 require transparency about supply chain practices but say little about how firms should 
behave; 
 do not yet appear to have changed corporate behaviour, although they have led firms to 
discuss how to address supply chain problems; 
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 have disappointed many of the activists who called for them; 
 can help governments and activists monitor those firms that do report, but firms are not 
providing the right kind or sufficient information to facilitate effective monitoring; and 
 can do little to empower workers. 
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is an independent international initiative founded in 1997 
to develop and manage a set of corporate sustainability reporting standards covering a range of 
economic, environmental and social issues.  The standards include guidance on what should be 
covered, with varying levels of ‘core’ and ‘additional’ performance criterial and levels of reporting 
(Siew, 2015, p. 182).  The GRI is the most popular framework for corporate responsibility 
reporting, used by more than 3,500 organizations in more than 60 countries (Williams, 2018, p. 
7) including two-thirds of the world’s 250 largest companies (Blasco & King, 2017, p. 28). 
Studies investigating the impact of companies’ participation in the GRI report mixed results.  One 
study comparing CO2 emissions produced by 64 companies in five different industry sectors over 
six years found no statistically significant difference between companies that were part of the 
GRI reporting system and those that were not, suggesting that ‘GRI reporting, by itself, has no 
direct impact whatsoever on companies’ sustainability performance’, at least as measured by 
CO2 emissions (Belkhir, Bernard, & Abdelgadir, 2017, p. 151).  Another academic study 
analysing the content of 933 GRI reports from seven industries across 30 countries found that 
the reports tended to be surprisingly uniform across all industries and countries, failing to reflect 
the issues that were most material for companies’ operations and stakeholders.  The authors 
conclude that GRI reporting has been successful in prompting outputs, but not in promoting real 
outcomes, and that ‘it is unlikely that GRI reporting will result in measurable contributions 
towards problem-solving in the areas the company reports on’ (Barkemeyer, Preuss, & Lee, 
2015, pp. 313, 324).  On the other hand, a more recent study looking at a wider range of 
environmental performance indicators did find that ‘the higher environmental reporting index is 
correlated with higher actual environmental score’, indicating that environmental reporting was 
linked with performance (Bednárová, Klimko, & Rievajová, 2019, p. 10). 
The UK Modern Slavery Act (2015) requires large companies operating in the UK to publish an 
annual statement describing the steps they have taken to ensure that slavery and human 
trafficking are not present in their operations or supply chains, or if no steps have been taken, 
companies must issue a statement stating that fact.  Details of what should be reported are not 
mandated, and there is no fixed penalty for failing to publish the statement (Nolan & Bott, 2018, 
pp. 52–53, 57).   
Compliance with the Act appears weak.  An independent registry reports that only 23% of the 
disclosure statements registered fulfilled even the three most basic requirements of being 
published on the company’s website with a link from the home page, signed by a director or 
equivalent, and containing a statement that the report has been approved by the company’s 
board (Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, 2019).  A campaigning organisation 
reviewing a selection of companies’ statements found ‘that many of these statements are not 
compliant with the basic requirements of the legislation and that the majority do not address in 
substantive detail the six topic areas listed in the Act’ (CORE Coalition, 2017, p. 8).  Another 
analysis of approximately 230 companies’ statements found that most were non-specific and did 
not identify priority risks, and many contained very similar wording, suggesting the use of 
common templates or model statements (Ergon Associates, 2016, p. 1). 
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The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act has required large retailers operating in 
California since 2012 to report on how they manage their supply chains to address risks of 
slavery, forced labour, and human trafficking, including how they audit and control their suppliers, 
how they hold employees and suppliers to account, and how they train employees and 
management on human trafficking and slavery. Companies are not required to take action on 
these issues, only to report on what they do, and there is no fixed penalty for non-compliance 
(Nolan & Bott, 2018, pp. 53, 57).   
The civil society organisation KnowTheChain argues that the Act is difficult to apply and monitor 
because of a lack of clarity about which companies are subject to it, and that companies’ 
disclosure statements contain ‘a significant number of inconsistencies between the law’s 
requirements and what was actually being publicly displayed’ including that 47% of the reports 
examined did not disclose sufficient information in all of the areas required by the Act 
(KnowTheChain, 2015, p. 6)   
Both the California and UK initiatives have been criticised as showing ‘a trend towards cosmetic 
compliance reporting rather than substantive reporting’ (Nolan & Bott, 2018, p. 53) and of falling 
‘short of any serious effort to combat their target human rights violations’ (Nolan & Bott, 2018, pp. 
53, 55).   
The Corporate Human Rights Benchmark ranks 200 of the largest publicly traded companies 
in the world operating in four sectors with a high risk of human rights abuse: agricultural 
products, apparel, extractives, and information and communications technology manufacturing.  
The Benchmark calculates an overall score of 24% (based on points awarded for performance 
across multiple themes and indicators), with one quarter of the companies scoring less than 10% 
and half failing to meet any of its five basic criteria for human rights due diligence, which it 
describes as a state of affairs that ‘should alarm governments and investors’ (Corporate Human 
Rights Benchmark, 2019, p. 4).  Although companies that have been included in the index since 
it began in 2017 have improved their performance (from 18% to almost 32%), companies added 
to the index more recently have brought the average down.  Overall, most companies 
demonstrate low human rights standards, a failure to implement the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights, and/or a lack of disclosure and transparency (Corporate Human 
Rights Benchmark, 2019, pp. 4–6). 
An EU directive on non-financial reporting will require large companies in the EU to disclose 
social, environmental and diversity information, but the process of transposing the directive into 
the laws of EU member countries has been slow and its impacts are only expected to begin to 
become visible in 2019 or 2020 (Blasco & King, 2017, p. 12).  The EU directive will require 
companies to report, but it does not impose a requirement to change practices or undertake due 
diligence (Nolan & Bott, 2018, p. 54).  
One trend which may be promising is the increasing number of large companies practicing 
integrated reporting – that is, integrating information about environmental and social 
performance into their annual reports which formerly contained only financial information.  This 
gives corporate responsibility information much greater prominence to investors.  78% of the 
world’s 250 largest companies now do this (Blasco & King, 2017, p. 21).  This trend has been 
driven mostly by increasing shareholder interest in sustainability, but has also been influenced by 
guidance from the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board and, in the USA, by securities 
regulations requiring climate change related disclosures (Blasco & King, 2017, p. 23). 
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4. Shareholder activism 
Shareholders of publicly traded companies have the right to be involved in corporate 
governance, but most shareholders do not take an active interest.  When the majority of 
investors in a company are passive, a minority of ‘activist’ investors who hold a relatively small 
proportion of shares (sometimes as little as 1% to 3% of shares) can exercise influence over the 
company by voting on (or merely threatening to vote on) motions for corporate decision making 
which can include selection of company directors or calling for strategic changes.  Most activist 
shareholders use their power for short-term financial gain by requiring companies to take actions 
that influence share prices or otherwise affect shareholder value, but others (of interest for the 
purposes of this report) attempt to influence company practices in favour of positive 
environmental, social, or corporate governance goals (Losasso & Dellecker, 2018, pp. 8–9). 
Shareholder activism has increased in the past ten years, having emerged first in the USA but 
now also growing in Europe and Asia (Losasso & Dellecker, 2018, p. 10).  Attempts to measure 
its extent provide varying estimates.  J.P. Morgan’s most recent annual report on shareholder 
activism recorded 651 campaigns in 2018, 51% in the USA and the remainder in Europe, Asia, 
and Australia, but does not disaggregate calls for responsible business practices from other 
possible shareholder objectives such as mergers, acquisitions, selection of directors, or other 
business decisions.  A 2013 report found that nearly 40% of shareholder resolutions submitted to 
Russell 3000 companies in the USA were related to ESG1 issues (Proxy voting Analytics 2014, 
cited in Grewal, Serafeim, & Yoon, 2016, p. 7); another report indicates that the proportion of 
resolutions addressing ESG issues has risen from around 33% in 2006-2010 to more than 50% 
by 2017 (Institutional Shareholder Services, n.d., cited in Eccles & Klimenko, 2019).  The 
responsible business shareholder activism network As You Sow reports between 400 and 500 
shareholder campaigns in the USA on environmental, social, and sustainability issues each year 
since 2010 (Welsh & Passoff, 2019, p. 5). 
There has been little research on shareholder activism in sub-Saharan Africa (Adegbite, 
Amaeshi, & Amao, 2012, p. 391) but shareholder activism appears to be much less established 
as an approach to corporate governance.  In Nigeria, there is a legal framework to support 
shareholder activism, and shareholders’ associations have arisen to promote small shareholders’ 
interests, but corruption is widespread, making corporate governance a difficult challenge, and 
most shareholder activism appears to be aimed at extracting wealth from companies or holding 
executives to account rather than at promoting responsible business practices (Adegbite et al., 
2012; Adegbite, Jones, & Uche, 2016).  In South Africa, shareholder activism is a fairly recent 
phenomenon but has become established as a way for shareholders to hold companies to 
account and to pursue ESG objectives  (Davids & Kitcat, 2019).  Shareholder activism is rarely 
conducted through formal shareholder resolutions, with most activism being conducted through 
questions, negotiations, and informal, often private, discussion with company management 
(Viviers, 2016, pp. 357–358).  The current iteration of the King code of conduct on corporate 
governance in South Africa, adopted by the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, encourages 
shareholder activism, so this approach to putting pressure on companies is expected to continue 
to increase in importance (Davids & Kitcat, 2019). 
                                                   
1 Environmental, social, and corporate governance; commonly used in the investing and business literature to 
refer to responsible and inclusive business practices 
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Campaigns for responsible business practices are usually led by pension funds, investment 
managers with a focus on sustainability, religious groups, or other coalitions of like-minded 
investors, usually on the grounds that long-term sustainability is in the best interests of the 
investors they represent (Losasso & Dellecker, 2018, p. 11).   
Campaigners are becoming more assertive and influential (J. P. Morgan, 2018, p. 6), and there is 
good evidence that shareholder activism is effective at influencing corporate behaviour, although 
its influence is often informal and indirect. Large investment managers often engage with 
companies informally and privately to influence them, discussing issues of concern and even 
providing guidelines to companies, rather than engaging in open confrontation in the form of a 
shareholder resolution (J. P. Morgan, 2018, pp. 6–7; Losasso & Dellecker, 2018, p. 13).   
Formal resolutions on ESG issues which are voted on by shareholders at a company’s annual 
general meeting do not usually receive majority support, with votes of around 20% in favour of 
such motions being typical (Grewal et al., 2016, p. 2; Losasso & Dellecker, 2018, p. 12).  The 
proportion of shareholders supporting such motions has been increasing rapidly in recent years, 
and there appears to be increased willingness on the part of companies to work with activist 
shareholders to resolve issues before they are brought to a vote (Papadopoulos, 2019).  
However, shareholder motions that fail can often still persuade management to adopt changes 
(Grewal et al., 2016, p. 2; Losasso & Dellecker, 2018, p. 12).  Resolutions that achieve the 
support of even 10% of shareholders are still considered influential, and resolutions that achieve 
support of 20% or more ‘send a clear message to corporate management and tend not to be 
ignored by any company’ (Losasso & Dellecker, 2018, p. 13).  A Harvard Business School study 
concluded that ‘filing shareholder proposals is effective at improving the performance of the 
company on the focal ESG issue… even though such proposals have rarely received majority 
support, they have still had an effect on corporate management’ (Grewal et al., 2016, p. 4).   
Some early studies of shareholder activism on ESG issues in the 2000s showed negligible or 
even negative effects on firms’ environmental performance, but more recent studies in the 2010s 
have shown more consistently positive results (Grewal et al., 2016, pp. 11–12).  Large numbers 
of success stories have been reported anecdotally: one firm that works with investors to support 
shareholder activism on ESG issues reported that they had made progress on about one-third of 
1,704 initiatives launched in 2017 (Eccles & Klimenko, 2019).  A Harvard Business School study 
in 2016 found that shareholder activism on sustainability led to increased transparency and more 
integrated reporting (Serafeim, 2015, cited in Grewal et al., 2016, p. 12). 
There is also convincing evidence that shareholder activism on ESG issues can be beneficial for 
firms’ financial performance.  A study of the shareholder activist work of one large institutional 
investment manager in the USA (Dimson, Karakas, & Li, 2015) looked at 2,152 instances of 
engaging with 613 different companies between 1999 and 2009, in which 18% of the 
engagements were considered to be successful in achieving their intended goals.  Companies 
where the engagements were considered successful showed positive stock market returns one 
year later: ‘the average one-year size-adjusted abnormal return after initial engagement is +7.1% 
for successful engagements, but there is no adverse reaction to unsuccessful ones’ (Dimson et 
al., 2015, p. 3261).  Another study, which looked at the impact of shareholder resolutions on 
corporate social responsibility that passed by very small margins of votes, found that approving 
and implementing such resolutions significantly increases shareholder value.  ‘On the day of the 
shareholder meeting, a CSR proposal that passes by a narrow margin of votes yields an 
abnormal return of 0.92% compared with a CSR proposal that fails marginally’, and subsequently 
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‘implementing a close call CSR proposal leads to an increase in shareholder value by about 
1.77%’ (Flammer, 2015, p. 2).  Not all studies confirm these findings, however: one study carried 
out in 2018 on the impact of shareholder proposals related to climate change found ‘no 
statistically significant impact on company returns one way or the other’ (Kalt, Turki, Grant, 
Kendall, & Molin, 2018, p. 3). 
5. Workers’ and managers’ values 
The degree to which workers’ and managers’ personal values influence companies’ business 
practices is a ‘highly contested point in management literature’ (Williams, 2018, pp. 3–4).  There 
appears to be limited and conflicting evidence on this question. 
Some studies argue that corporate social responsibility ‘is motivated by the organizational 
environment and as such, not by the existence of intrinsic values within a firm’ (Shnayder, Van 
Rijnsoever, & Hekkert, 2016, p. 213).  However, there is some limited evidence, mostly from 
small scale studies, that suggests that a company’s approach to corporate social responsibility 
may be influenced by the personal values of managers and workers.  A study of 473 Dutch 
corporate executives, for example, found that their values and beliefs had a significant effect on 
their companies’ corporate social responsibility performance.  The study confirmed that the 
contribution of CSR to the long term financial performance of the company was a significant 
motive, but also found that CSR performance was higher where executives were inclined to 
perceive CSR as an ethical duty and were more concerned about meeting moral duties, and 
where executives are more altruistic (Graafland & Mazereeuw-Van Der Duijn Shouten, 2012, pp. 
391–392).  Another study finds that firms in the USA located in areas of higher social capital 
demonstrate higher levels of corporate social responsibility.  The authors argue that this can be 
explained by the fact that some regions are more altruistic than others because of historic 
traditions and norms, and that managers are likely to be influenced by the norms of the region 
where they live, which in turn influences decisions at the corporate level (Jha & Cox, 2015). 
Some authors have noted that the ‘Millennial generation’ (people born between 1983 and 1994) 
place a great deal of importance on corporate social responsibility, and argue that their 
increasing presence in the workplace may influence corporate behaviour.  Deloitte, for example, 
argues that Millennials (and members of ‘Generation Z’, born between 1995 and 2002) ‘want all 
of the talk business gives to purpose to become meaningful action, and for business leaders to 
serve as agents for positive change. They expect business to enhance lives and provide 
livelihoods, but they don’t see enough businesses standing up and filling the void’ (Deloitte, 
2019, p. 26). 
There appears to be little concrete evidence on the extent of Millennials’ influence on corporate 
behaviour as workers or managers, but there is evidence of discontentment and idealism.  A 
survey of 13,416 Millennials and 3,009 Gen Zs across 42 countries (mostly high-income 
countries, but also including Nigeria, South Africa, and several Asian low- or middle-income 
countries) that has been running for eight years has found increasingly negative opinions about 
business.  Only 55% of respondents in 2019 said that business has a positive impact on society, 
down from 61% last year and more than 70% in the four years before that.  The trend towards 
negative views was steepest in developing countries, where approval of business has dropped 
from 85% two years ago to 61%, compared with respondents in wealthier countries where 
approval has dropped from 66% to 50% over the same period (Deloitte, 2019, p. 11).  Survey 
respondents increasingly say that businesses focus on their own agendas rather than 
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considering wider society (76%) and show ‘a continuing misalignment between millennials’ 
priorities and what they perceived to be business’s purpose’ (Deloitte, 2019, p. 11).  
6. Business performance benefits 
There is increasingly robust evidence from academic research and from major investment 
management firms that implementing sustainable business practices can be beneficial for 
companies’ financial performance.  
Responsible business practices contribute to financial performance largely through the reduction 
of business risks.  ‘Breaches of environmental regulations, human rights abuses or governance 
issues, such as corruption, can result in fines, directly impacting the company, but can also hurt 
reputation and lead to a significant loss of revenue if customers abandon businesses during a 
scandal’ (Nordea Equity Research, 2017, p. 2).  Good ESG performance is also linked with 
innovations which can produce competitive advantages; good labour standards contribute to 
productivity and lower staff turnover costs; and diversity of leadership is linked with better overall 
management (Bank of America Merrill Lynch, 2016, p. 2). 
Some studies find that corporate social responsibility detracts from financial performance.  For 
example, Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014, p. 177) find ‘a negative correlation between CSR and 
future stock prices and operating performance.  Other studies have found a positive 
relationships, no relationships, negative relationships, or variable (for example, U-shaped) 
relationships between corporate social responsibility and financial performance, but meta-
analyses conclude that ‘a positive relationship is more common than other types’ (Galant & 
Cadez, 2017, p. 677). 
A long-term Harvard Business School study found that ‘companies that developed organizational 
processes to measure, manage, and communicate performance on ESG issues in the early 
1990s outperformed a carefully matched control group over the next 18 years’ (Eccles & 
Klimenko, 2019, p. 111).  Nordea Equity Research finds strong and consistent evidence that 
‘companies that score higher on ESG demonstrate better operational performance, with regards 
to both the level and the stability of returns’ since 2012, which they attribute largely to ESG 
performance indicating better risk management (Nordea Equity Research, 2017, pp. 2, 5).  Bank 
of America Merrill Lynch has called ESG performance ‘the best signal we have found for future 
risk’ (Bank of America Merrill Lynch, 2017, p. 1), reliably indicating the likelihood of future 
volatility, earnings risk, price declines and bankruptcies, and reporting that ‘stocks that ranked 
within the top third by ESG scores relative to their peers would have outperformed stocks in the 
bottom third by about 18ppt from 2005 to today’ (Bank of America Merrill Lynch, 2016, pp. 1, 3). 
An evaluation of the ILO/IFC ‘Better Work’ programme in the garment sector in Vietnam found 
that better working conditions were linked with higher worker productivity and higher factory 
profitability (International Labour Organization, 2016, pp. 30–31).  Some factories participating in 
the programme saw profit increase by as much as 8%, the revenue-cost ratio across all factories 
increased by 25%, and firms experienced larger orders with more favourable contract terms 
(International Labour Organization, 2016, pp. 31–32).  The ILO speculates that managers may 
lack capacity to change established practices, may view workers as dehumanised, or may lack 
the necessary information on the business case for improving working conditions (International 
Labour Organization, 2016, p. 33). 
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